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f “ 了 蘭 ！ 』 
Abstract 
Using a framework of a small capital-importing economy with unemployment, 
we analyze the optimal combinations of environmental and trade policies. 
Environmental taxes are imposed to partially correct the pollution distortion. In addition, 
some other means of taxation, i.e, taxes on foreign capital, are also considered to 
examine the effects on welfare with or without tax credits. In order to improve social 
welfare, we investigate whether the policies can reduce the amount of pollution as well 
as lower the level of unemployment. 
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1 Introduction 
For a long period of time, economists have investigated various policies to 
protect the environment. One of the most obvious measures is the envi-
roninental taxes. Many econoiriists suggested that pollution taxes are an 
effec:ierit instrurnent for achieving environniental objectives. Environmental 
taxes may yield benefits over and above a cleaner environment, as the rev-
enue from pollution taxes can be used to reduce other distortionary taxes. 
Some said this yields a “ double dividend". Therefore, the role of environ-
mental taxes may go beyond that of only an instrument for environmental 
protection and can also raise some revenues (see Oates, 1991). When we con-
sider the environmental issues with the international trade, Bhagwati [1971 
found that the first-best policy requires a pollution tax to alleviate the envi-
ronniental externality and a trade tax to improve the terms of trade. Much 
of the interest has centered on second-best policies for the case where only 
one instrument is available. If trade policy is the only instrument, Baumol 
and Oates [2] arid Markusen [14] show that in the presence of pollution, the 
optimal tariff may be differ from the level that would maximize rent extrac-
. tion from foreigners, since the policymaker must also consider the effect of 






Most the previous works focus on trade policies and environmental tax in 
the developed economies. When we consider the developing economies, there 
is a variety of serious market imperfection that does not ususally appear in 
the developed economies. Manufacturing is often protected by high trade bar-
riers ,unemployment is a common phenomenon. Chao and Yu [1994] studied 
. t h e welfare effect of export share requirements in the less developed countries 
using a generalized Harris-Todaro [1970]. In these less developed countries, 
they have faced a severe shortage of domestic capital which has constituted 
a major obstacle to their economic growth. Therefore, they strongly de-
pend on the imported foreign capital. However, they focused on the export 
share requirement and pollution didn't enter their model. Several North-
South models pinpointed the reallocation of some polluted industries from 
the rich north to the poor south. We also see that such measures improve the 
welfare as a whole even the south may get polluted after the implantation of 
the polluted industries. 
For this paper, I focus on the environmental protection policies in the 
developing economies which are characterized by the exportation of primary 
products (e.g. food crops) and the importation of manufacturing goods, 
and most importantly, high urieinployinent rate, which may be a result of 
爭 
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iininature economic growth, dorninaton of unskilled labor and insufficient 
capital. Firstly, the pollution taxes are used to lower the level of pollution 
and bring revenue to the governirierit. Since the sectors are protected with 
tariffs, which bring tariff revenue and protect that sector, another kind of 
instruments need to prevent the loss of tariff revenue via the local production 
with foreign capital. For this purpose, we employ the foreign capital taxes 
to achieve that purpose. As we will look into the model that the effect 
of the taxes on the level of unemployment, thereby affecting the welfare of 
the economy. Those analysis differ from Chao and Yu (1998). We are also . 
interested to see the trade liberalization on the effect of pollution taxes and 
capital taxes. Futhermore, the tax credit system is common in most of the 
OECD countries. We also analyze how different in the environmental and 
tax policies when the tax credit system is introduced in the economy. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Section 3 reviews the literature on the 
studies of the pollution policy. Section 4 sketches the benchmark model of a 
small, capital-importing economy, and briefly discusses the welfare effects of 
foreign investment and polutiori policy. Section 5 examine the host-country's 
op til rial policies for foreign investment and pollution when investment tax 
credi ts are allowed in the source country. Section 6 provides some conclusions. 
3 
2 Literature Review 
This section consists of five parts: the first part reviews pollution policy as 
an exogenous policy for correcting the pollution distortion, the second part 
discusses how the income level determines the environmental policy, the third 
part reveals the trade and environmental policies in an open economy., the 
fourth part examines the deviation of the environmental taxation when there 
are the presence of other taxes, the fifth part investigate the tax and tax credit 
system, the final part studies the foreign investment with the environmental 
policies. 
»» 
2.1 Income Level and Environmental policy 
Grossman and Krueger [1993] found out that trade liberalization may im-
prove the environment because it raises incomes that create a demand for 
better enforcement of pollution regulations. On the other hand, Copeland 
and Taylor [1994], using a North-South trade model, found that the income 
level may determine the choice of stance of environmental protection. For 
the rich North it will choose to specialize in relatively clean goods. Also 
‘ they showed that by isolating the scale, compostiiori, and technique effects 
of international trade on pollution, free trade increased world pollution; an 
4 
increase in the rich North's production possibilities increases pollution, while 
similar growth in the poor South lowers pollution; and unilateral transfers 
from North to South reduce worldwide pollution. 
2.2 International Trade and Environmental policy 
In particular, several authors have considered optimal trade and environ-
mental policies in an open economy which can influence its terms of trade. 
As is well-known from the literature on distortions (e.g., Bhagwati [3])’ the 
first-best policy requires two instruments: a trade tax to improve the terms 
of trade and pollution tax to offset the environmental externality. Much of 
the interest has centered on second-best policies for the case where only one 
instruiTient is available. If trade policy is the only instrument, Baumol and 
Oates [2] and Markusen [14] show that in the presence of pollution, the op-
timal tariff may be higher or lower than that which would maximize rent 
extraction from foreigners, since the policymaker must also consider the ef-
fect, of the tariff on pollution levels. Similarly, if tariff levels are exogenous, 
Markiisen [14] and Krutilla [12] show that optimal second-best pollution taxes 
will be either higher or lower than those which would fiillly internalize the ex-
ternality, since terms of trade effects must b》considered. They characterize 
• 
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optimal policies with one pollution distortion and one trade distortion. 
C'opelarid [1994] investigates the welfare effects of trade reforms and en-
viron mental policy in a distorted small open economy. His work differs from 
the above literatrue. He focuses on small changes in policy which move an 
economy with many pol lut ion and trade distortions in the direction of the 
optimum. Also, he compares regimes where taxes have been used to control 
pollution with regimes where quotas are used. He finds that quotas tend to 
inhibit, spillover effects. In the absence of quotas, a policy which succeeds in 
reducing the level of one pollutant can backfire if it stimulates the produc-
tiori of some other pollutant. If a quota is place, then this feedback effect 
need not occur, and hence the policymaker c^n be more confident that the 
policy reform will not have an unintended side effect. Finally, he extends the 
analysis to allow for international factor mobility which makes the case for 
control of pollution externalities more compelling. Although international 
factor mobility does increase the output effects of a change in pollution pol-
icy, it also magnifies the external damage arising from pollution taxes which 
are too low. Thus, although the relation between trade and pollution policy 
• is complex, the cost of doing nothing will likely increase as markets become 
more integrated. 
6 
Pollution policy in the following literature is an exogenous policy. Serveral 
previous studies [Bauinol and Gates 1988; Pethig 1976; Siebert et al. 1980; 
McGuire 1982] have investigated the effects of pollution policy on the pattern 
of trade. Pethig [1976] extends the two-good Ricardian model to include 
pollution, and shows that if two countries are identical, except that they 
exogenously set different emission standards, then the country which allows 
a higher level of polution emissions will export the pollution-intensive good. 
Siebert et al. [1980] and McGuire [1982] extend the analysis to the case of 
two primary factors. 
2.3 Other taxes and Environmental taxation 
Bovenberg and Goulder [1996] examined the deviation of the optimal environ-
mental tax rates from rates implied by the Pigovian principle in a second-best 
setting where other, distortionary taxes are present. 
There are some other partial equilibrium analysis on this issue. Dwight 
R. Lee and Walter S. Misiolek [1986] and Wallace E. Gates [1991], who de-
rive formulas linking the optimal rate for a newly imposed environmental tax 
to the marginal excess burden from existing taxes. In a general-equilibrium 
setting, Agnai, Sandmo [1975] and Boveribei^ and Frederick van der Ploeg 
7 
[1994] have demonstrated how the well-known “ Ramsey" formula for opti-
mal commodity taxes is altered when one of the consumption commodities 
generates an externality. 
2.4 Unemployment 
The continued existence of rural-urbari migration in spite of substantial over 
- urban-uneniployment represents an economically rational choice on the part 
of the individual migrant. They also show economists standard policy pre-
scription of generating urban employment opportunities through the use of 
"shadow prices" implemented by means of wage subsidies/ direct govern-
ment hiring will not lead to welfare improvement and may, in fact, exacer-
bate the problem of urban unemployment. In addition, they evaluate the 
welfare implications of alternative policies associated with various back-to-
the-land programs when it is recognized that the standard remedy suggested 
by economic theory, namely, full wage flexibility, is for all practical purpose 
politically infeasible. Attention is paid on the impact of migration unem-
ployment on the welfare of the rural sector as a whole which gives rise to 
- intersectoral compensation requirements. Last but nto least, Harris and To-
daro(1970) argue that in the absence of wage flexibility, an optimal policy is 
8 
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a policy package including both partial wage subsidies (or direct government 
employ merit) and measures to restrict free migration. 
2.5 Tax and Tax Credits 
Bond [1991] examines the optimal trade and tax policy combinations for a 
small country when the rest of the world follows a policy allowing tax credits 
for tax payments to foreign countries. Under a tax credit policy, the tax 
liability that is owed to the source country is reduced by the amount of taxes 
paid to the host country. This t3^pe of taxation differs from the previous 
literature on optimal tax and tariff" policy, where it is assumed that host 
country taxation of investment flows has no,, effect on tax liability to the 
source country. 
2.6 Foreign Investment and Environmental policy 
Beladi, Chau, and Khan [2000] also use a North-South model to show that 
the neglect of pollution-generating effects of foreign investment will lead to 
distorted and misleading policy recommendations. Their model formalizes 
• that for an urispecialized capital-poor, resource-rich South, such pollution-
generating effects provide incentives for the North to encourage, rather than 
• 
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to discourage, foreign invest merit abroad and strengthen Southern incentives 
to restrict foreign investment more sharply than is conventionally assummed. 
The model sheds light on three interrelated aspects of international trading 
relations: production asyrrunetry, incomplete markets, and monopolistic ad-
vantage. 
Pethig (1976) and Siebert (1977) argue that strict environmental stan-
dards diminish the competitive position of a country's pollution-intensive in-
dustry. McGuire (1982) further shows that environmental regulations cause 
firms in a pollution-intensive industry to relocate their plants to countries 
with lax environmental policies. In a recent paper, Copeland and Taylor 
(1997) find that capital mobility tends to cause world pollution to rise, as 
pollution intensive production shifts to countries with less environmental 
regulations. 
Chao and Yu [2000] have examined the second-best optimal policies for 
a small open economy regarding foreign investment in conjunction with en-
vironniental preservation. They set foreign-investment policy and environ-
mental policy either independent or jointly. 
Chao and Yu [1998] have ai.gued the joint effect of capital tax and en-
viroiirnerit tax with a tariff restriction. This^paper is an extension on their 
10 
works . This paper differs from them in two ways. First, for the developing 
nations, manufactm.ing is often protected by high trade barriers, while high 
unemployment is a common phenomenon. Therefore, I incorporate the un-
eniployinent factor, which may affect the policymaking decision. Second, as 
globalization is a common trend, I will consider the effect of trade liberaliza-
tion on the determination of the optimal policies. 
2.7 Pollution and Unemployment 
Koskela, Schob and Sinn [1998] analyze that when consumers choose between 
clean and dirty goods and the labour market clears, a green tax reform may 
not bring about a double dividend in the sense of increasing environmental 
quality and increasing employment. However, when firms choose between 
clean and dirty factors of production, and when there is unemployment, 
such a result is very likely to occur. The paper investigates a model of a 
monopolistic firm where labour and energy are factors of production and 
trade unions negotiate teh wage rate, accepting some unemployment as a 
result of aggressive wage demands. It is shown that, in such a framework, 
a green tax reform will boost employment provided it does not increase the 




subsitituton bet,ween labour and energy is greater than one, equal to one or 
not, too far below one. 
Koskela and Schob [1999] argued that pollution taxes produces addtiional 
tax revenues which can be used to replace labour taxes and thus reap a dou-
ble dividend in the form of improving environmental quality and alleviating 
uriemployment. They analysed the employment effects of revenue-neutral 




3 The Framework 
I deploy a generalized Harris-Todaro [1970] model. The developing economy 
consists of two sectors, urban manufacturing, A', and mral agricultural, Y , 
with one type of pollutant, Z、 
The home country, which is a price-taker in world trade, exports the 
agricultural products and imports manufacture goods. As the production 
process of good A" generates the pollutants, several policies are employed 
to protect the environment, including environment taxes, tariffs and capital 
taxes on foreign capital. »» 
Production functions for goods X and Y are assumed to be linearly ho-
mogeneous and concave. The production functions are, as follows: 
A' = X { L x , K , V ) (1) 
= y{Ly ,T) (2) 
where L^ denote the labor employed to the ith sector i (i = X, Y), respec-
_ lively. T is land specific to V, and K is foreign capital specific to X. Note 
that K 二 K + Kf, where K is fixed domestic-capital and Kj is foreign capi-
13 
tal. The parameter V denotes a set of local institutional and cultural factors 
available to foreign firms. This factor represents, for example, local agents 
and lobbyists who are familiar with the indigenous language, customs and 
bureaucracy production, management: and marketing in the host country [see 
Caves, 1971; Batia and Rarnacharidran, 1980; Das, 1981]. Thus, it appears 
reasonable to assume that V is wholly domestic owned. While foreign capital 
are used, the labor employed comprises only domestic workers. Factors are 
assumed to exhibit positive, but diminishing, marginal positive cross partial 
derivatives. Choosing good Y as the numeraire, its price equals unity. For 
simplicity, we suppress the fixed domestic land endowment in the revenue 
function. 
The polluting firms produce good X by using domestic labour and capital 
stock, K. Suppose the country imports good X with restrictions in the form 
of an import tariff, t. The trade restrictions render the domestic price of 
goods X, denoted by p, higher than its world price, p*. Note that p is fixed 
to p* -\-t under tariff. ^  To bypass trade restrictions, foreign firms may choose 
to invest directly in the host country. 
As foreign investment leads to an expansion in the production of pollut-
^Trade barriers exist in the first place to protect^the importable sector. 
14 
ing sector A', the enviromrient deteriorates with a higher level of pollution, 
denoted by Z. Following Copeland (1994), pollution is modelled as a by-
product of producing goods A" in the host country.^ In this paper, a pollution 
tax, is imposed on the production of good X to protect the environment. 
For simplicity, we assume the output level of pollutant, Z、is one-to-one to 
the product, A', i.e, dZjdX — 1, I assume that pollution adversely affects 
the utility of consumers, but that it does not generate external effects on 
production functions. The output level of pollutant is summarized as 
" Z 二 (3) 
Turning to the factor markets, workers are paid according to the values 
of their marginal products under profit maximization. 
wx = pXL (4) 
•Wy = n (5) 
‘ ‘2Alternatively, pollution can be modelled as an input. See Yu and Ingene (1982), and 




where wx and Wy denote the wage rates in sectors X and Y, respectively. 
We assume that sector A' is located in the urban area, while sector V 
is in the niral area. Alllioiigh workers can move freely between the urban 
and rural sectors, the urban wage rate is set institutionally at a level higher 
than the market - clearing wage, and hence urban unemployment emerges. 
Following Harris and Toclaro (1970), it is hypothesized that at the labor 
market equilibrium the rural wage is equal to the expected urban wage, which 
is Wx multiplied by the probability of employment in the urban sectors: 
Wx/{1 + X ) ^ W Y (6) 
where X — Ly / Lx > 0 is the urban unemployment ratio and 1/(1 + A) serves 
as an index for the probability of finding a job.3 Here, Ly represents the 
level of urban uriernploymerit. By using the definition of A, we can write the 
labor constraint as 
(1+X)LX + LY =L (7) 
_ ^Tlie urban uneinployrnent rate is given by Lu/ {Lx + Ly) = A/ (1 + A), which is 
positively related to A. 
16 
‘ - . • 
where L is the endowment of domestic labor. 
Based on the values of marginal products of capital, the rate of capital 
returns in sector A', denoted by Vx, is 
rx = pA'k (8) 
The rate of returns to specific factor V, which is totally domestic owned, 
is given by 
_ TV = pXv (9) 
The above set of equations (1) through (8> delineates the production side 
of the model, which can be summarized by the following restricted revenue 
function: 
R{p, 1,A, K) 二 max[pX + V - 6'Z : (1 + X)Lx + Ly 二 T：] (10) 
with respect to L, and K. Here K and r* denote, respectively, capital for 
sector A' and its returns. It is assumed that K is endogenous, while r* is 
given in the world capital market. By using the envelope theorem, we have 
* 
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/?',,(二 dRIdT)�= X ,尺\(= dR/dA) = - w x L x < 0 and B s ( = dR/ds) = -Z. 
See (.'opeland (1994) for a definition of this type of revenue function.4 
We turn next to the demand side of the model, which can be represented 
by the country's expenditure function, as follows: 
B(p, l,u, Z) = rnm[pL>:r + Dy : U{Dx, Dy, Z) > u] (11) 
where Di denotes the demand for good i, U{-) is the utility function and Ey > 
0 and u is the level of welfare. Equation(11) is the minimum expenditure 
needed in the host country to attain a given utility level u, facing the relative »» “ 
price p of good X and the level of pollution Z. Notice that dU/dZ < 
0, as pollution adversely affects utility, and thus more spending on goods ‘ 
is needed, i.e. Ez > 0, for keeping the same level of utility. E z is the 
marginal willingness to pay for reductions in pollution. Thus, Ez represents 
the marginal damage caused by pollution. Note that by Shepherd's Lemma, 
the consumer's compensated demand for good Y is given by Ey and for good 
X by Ep = Dx. We assume, for concreteness, that Epz = dDxjdZ < 0, 
namely, good X and pollution Z are substitutes in consumption; demand for 





good A' declines as the pollution level rises.^ 
Any revenues collected by the government is assumed to be rebated in a 
lump-sum manner to the consumer. Hence, given the tariffs t, capital taxes 
r and pollution taxes s, the equilibrium condition for the economy is given 
by 
E(p,l,u,z) = R(j),l,\s,K) + tM + TKf + sZ -r*Kf (12) 
M = EpipA,u, Z)-Rp{p,l,X,s,K) (13) 
一 Rs = -Z (14) 
Ri<-r- T* = r*-r* , (15) 
where M denotes the home country's imports of good X. Equation (12) 
states the home-country's budget constraint: the value of consumption at 
domestic prices equals the GDP plus tax revenues, accrued from tariff rev-
enue, capital taxes and pollution taxes minus the returns paid to foreign 
5C()pelancl (1994) provides an example to illustrate the case that Epz < 0. Pollution 
may destroy wilderness and thus lead to a reduction in the demand for hiking shoes. In 
fact, the conditions for the negative Epz are d'^ic/dOxdZ < 0 and d'^u/dDydZ > 0. Good 
. X and pollution Z can also be complements in consumption, for example, higher pollution 




capital repatriated to the foreign country. Equation (13) defines net imports 
of good X equal the difference between domestic consumption and its lo-
cal supply, where, Rp = OR/dp = A', denoting the quantity produced in 
the home country. The excess demand for good X will be met by imports. 
The level of imports, M , in equation (13) is endogenously determined under 
the framework of tariffs analysis. Equation (14) recover the pollution levels 
from the economy's revenue function, and equation (15) gives the equilib-
rium condition of the capital market, which requires the same after-tax of 
returns between countries. The equations are useful in assessing the effects 
of changes in pollution taxes and tariff on resources allocation and national 
welfare. 
The endogenous variables Lx, K, L y , X , u in the model can be solved by 
using (3) - (7)，（12) and (13) as functions of the policy instruments s，丁 and 
t. The system can be solved in a stepwise manner as follows. Firstly, the 
resource allocation effects of changes in tariffs, pollution taxes and foreign 
capital taxes can be deterniined by (3) - (7). Secondly, the welfare effects 
of pollution taxes arid foreign captial taxes under a given tariff can be ob-




3.1 Resource allocation 
As shown in the Appendix, by using (3) and (4) - (7)，we can obtain dLx j d t > 
0, dli'f/dt > 0, dLy/dt < 0 and dX/dt < 0. An increase in t results in a rise 
in the effective price for the producer of the importable goods. This leads 
to an expansion in the manufacturing sector, more urban labor employment 
and at the same time more foreign capital import; an contraction in the 
agricultural sector and less rural labor employment in which they may enter 
the urban area to find a job in the manufacturing sector or become unem-
ployed. The increase in labor of the manufacturing sector, Lx , draws from 
the urban unemployed labor {Lu) as well as the labor in the rural region, Ly 
{dLy/dt < 0). Thus, dLy/dt < 0 and consequently the urban unemploy-
ment ratio falls, dXjdt < 0. 
Also we have dLx/ds < 0,dK/ds < O^dLy/ds > 0 and dX/ds > 0. An 
increase in s results in the rise of production cost in the manufacturing good 
A'.「rhis leads to an contraction in the manufacturing sector, more urban 
labor unemployment and less foreign capital import; an expansion in the 
rural sector and more rural labor employment. Some of them turn to rural 
. sector {DLy /ds > 0) or become unemployed. Hence, OLy/ds > 0 and the 




Finally for the impact of the capital taxes, we have dLx/dr < 0, dK/dr < 
0, dLy/dr > 0 and dX/dr > 0. An increase in r results in the increase 
cost of capital, thus less foreign capital will be imported. As the manufac-
turing sector shrinks, some labor in that sector may become unemployed 
arid the rural sector expands, which attracts more labor to work in mral 
sectoi-{dLY/ds > 0). Therefore, dLy/dr > 0 and the urban unemployment 
ratio rises, dX/dr > 0. 
3.2 National Welfare 
»» 
In the small open economy under a given tariff, the welfare effects of changes 
in investment and pollution taxes can be obtained by differentiating (12) and 
(13) as 
{Eu - tEpu)du = [s - {Ez - tEpz)]dZ - tRpsds + Rx{dX/dr)dT 
+Rx{dX/ds)ds + (T - tRpK)dk (16) 
where Eu = dE/du > 0’ Epu = dDx/du > 0 and Epp = dDx/dp < 0. 




Equation (16) is revealing about the first-best optimum. For a small open 
economy with the erivironmeiital externality, the first-best policy is free trade 
in goods and factors (p = p* and 亡=0) along with a Pigouvian tax {s = Ez) 
on pollution. Under free trade, no foreign capital would flow in. This is 
a well-known result where the Pigouvian tax fully internalizes the marginal 
damage from pollution in the absence of other distortions (i.e., free trade) in 
the economy. 
3.2.1 O p t i m a l Cap i ta l Taxes 
The welfare effect of capital taxes in isolation can be deduced from (16). The 
effect hinges upon the resource allocational effect of changes in the policy 
measure. Basically, an increase in the capital tax on the foreign capital 
raises the cost of manufacture good X�thereby causing a decline in the 
production of good X and hence an decrease in the emissions of pollutant Z\ 
that is, dZ/dr < 0. From the above resources allocation, we have dX/dr > 0 
and dX/dr < 0. 
By (16), the welfare effect of the changes in the capital tax is, 
23 
{Eu - tEpu)du/dT = [s - {Ez - tEpz)]{dZ/dT) + R,^{dX/dr) 
+ ( j — tRpK)(dk/d 丁) (17) 
Note that Epz = dDxjdZ < 0, as we assume Dx and Z are subtitutes; and 
by virtue of the Rybczynski effect, Rpk = dX/OK > 0, when X is capital 
intensive relative to Y. 
As T increases, the inflow of the foreign capital decreases {dk/dr < 0). 
There arises two" contradictory effects from the decrease in capital tax revenue 
and the increase in imports of manufacture good X on welfare. Also dX/dr > 
0 and Rx < 0, it is welfare loss upon the increase of unemployment. In 
the meantime, the resulting increase in pollution [dZjdr < 0) generates 
dual effects on welfare: a drop in the pollution-tax revenue and a decline in 
environmental damage. The former effect is welfare reducing, while the latter 
is welfare improving. Thus, the welfare effect of the capital tax is, in general, 
irideterrriinate, depending on the magnitude of the pollution tax, capital tax 
and tariff. 




the capital tax may be welfare improving if the capital-induced unemploy-
merit effect can be outweigiited by either the gain from receiving extra tariff 
revenue or the reduction in the expenditure on compensating the utility. 
Since the relationship between welfare and capital taxes is non-monotone 
in the present framework, it is meaningful to explore the issue of the optimal 
capital tax rate which the host country may adopt to maximize domestic 
welfare. By setting du/dr = 0 in (17), the optimum capital tax is derived as 
/ 
\ 
。 [tRpK {clk/dr) + {Ez - tEpz) dZ/dr] 
T = 1 /{dk/dr) (18) 
" —Rx {dx/dr) - s{dZ/dT) 
\ 
/ 
The optimal 丁。in (18) depends negatively on the level of 5. The relation 
between them is monotonically decreasing and can be plotted as schedule in 
figure 1. This schedule shows that there is a trade-off between the two policies 
foi. attaining a iriaximum welfare level. Namely, the higher the pollution tax, 
the lower the capital tax, vice versa. When t = s = 0, the optimal tax rate 
of foreign capital is positive, r。= EzidZ/dr)/{dk/dr) — RxidX/dr) > 0. 
Following the technique develpoed by Neary (1993, 1995), we substitute 
r。of (18) into (17) to yield the welfare effect of a change in r: 
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{Eu - tEpu)du/dT 二 {dk/DT){T - r。） (19) 
As dk/dr < 0, we have du/dr > (<) 0’ since r < (>) T。. That is, if r is 
not equal to T° initially, movements in r towards r° lead to welfare increases. 
This implies that a rise (fall) in r will improve welfare for any given tariff t 
and pollution taxes s when r lies below (above) t。. 
3.2.2 O p t i m a l Env i r onmen t a l Taxes 
Let us turn to the welfare effect of changes in environmental protection in 
terms of pollution taxes. An increase in pollution taxes lowers the producers' 
prices of good X, thereby causing a fall in the production of good X and hence 
a fall in the emission of pollution Z; that is dX/ds < 0 and dZ/ds < 0. 
By using (16)，the welfare effect of the changes in pollution taxes is 
(Eu - tEpu)du/ds = -tRps + Rx{d\lds) + [5 - {Ez - tEpz)][dZlds) 
^ T - t R p K ) { d k l d s ) (20) 




lowers the prodution of A'. 
The first term on the right-hand side is positive tariff revenue arised from 
the compensation of the decline in production of good X locally. The sign 
of the second term and third is indeterminate, depending on the values of s 
and r. As an inci.ese in pollution taxes leads to a contraction of the proteced 
good A', pollution taxes yield a 'double dividend' in that the taxes not only 
create a cleaner environment but also mitigate the tariff-induced production 
distortion. 
In the presence of a pre-existing tariff and capital taxes, the (third-best) 
optimal choice of s is obtained by setting du/ds = 0 in (20): 
s 。 = {t(dXlds) - R人dXl'ds) - ij -tRpK)�dklds) 
+{Ez - tEpz)dZ/ds}/{dZ/ds) (21) 
t 
The optimal s�in (21) depends negatively on the level of r. The relation 
between thern is monotonically decreasing and can be plotted as schedule 
in figure 1. This schedule obtained matches with the result that we derived 
in the section of optimal capital tax. K i 二 T = 0, we have s° 二 Ez -
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R,\{dX/ds). Ill the absence of other types of distortions, the environmental 
externality in an unemployed economy can be internalized be setting the tax 
rate equal to the marginal damage caused by pollution and wefare loss due 
to inlernploymerit caused by environmental taxes. 
Again, we subsitute s。of (21) into (20) to yield the welfare effect of a 
change in s: 
[Eu — tEpu)du/ds 二 {dZ/ds){s - s。） （22) 
As dZ/ds < 0, we have du/ds > (<) 0，since s < (>) s°. This indicates 
the direction in which pollution tax should be adjusted in order to move 
the economy closer to the third-best optimum. If s > s°, then s should be 
reduced; if s < s°’ it should be increased. The desired adjustments in s are 
shown by the horizontal arrows in figure 1. 
Figure 1 illustrates the case of jointly optimal positive investment taxes 
and environmental taxes; Figure 2 depicts the case of jointly optimal pos-
itive investment taxes and optimal negative environmental taxes; Figure 3 
describes the case of jointly optimal negative investment taxes and optimal 
‘ positive enviromnerital taxes. Since we have positve y-intercept, we don't 
have the case of jointly optimal negative investment taxes and environmen-
28 
f * 
tal taxes, i.e. at least one of the taxes must be non-negative. 
3.2.3 J o i n t l y O p t i m a l Policies 
We are now examining the welfare effect of simulataneous changes in both 
policies. By combing (19) and (22)，we obtain 
[Eu - tEpu)du = {dZlds){s - s�)ds + {dk/dT){T - T�)d丁 (23) 
111 the presence of the existing tariff, the relationship between s�and 丁。 
is of interest because it sheds light on the second-best optimum. The jointly 
optimal solution of investment and pollution taxes, which is the intersection 
of the 丁。and 6.° schedules. The iso-welfare contours are illustrated in Figure 
1 by a map of ellipses. By solving (18) and (21) simultaneously, we obtain 
s � � = Ez- tEpz + t{dX/ds)B - Rx(dX/ds)B - R,,(dX/dr)C (24) 
wViPre R — DX:丄 ^ n n — Di^KsXn-XisXS^K) 、n 
wneie U — p2Ax,X,siXLLXKK-Xl^)〈 U)。一 pAX^Xr^siX^^iX^K-Xl^)〉U. 
When we are evaluating the sign of s°°, we need to consider the two 




the result that their effects contradict each other. The reasoning is strict 
forward as if we have a higher pollution taxes, and by previous argument, 
the optimal capital taxes should be lower. Hence the welfare loss arised 
from the uneinployment caused by the higher pollution taxes contradicts the 
welfare gain arised from the reduced unemployment in the presence of lower 
capital taxes. By evaluating the magnitude of the two effects, unemployment 
effect from the pollution taxes dominates that from capital taxes (see the 
Appendix). 
s 。 。 ^ E z - tEpz + t{dX/ds)B - ^ 0 (25) 
However, we still cannot determine the sign of s。。. We need to consider 
the magnitude of the adjusted benefit of producing good X and the environ-
ment effect, Ez And we find that the cost is greater than the benefit (see 
the Appendix). 
s。。二 t(^dX/ds")B - tEpz + Ez-pH>0 (26) 
V rr Lx{l + '\fYcL , 1 
-where H = < ^ 
A high pollution tax leads to a lower levef of pollution Z, thereby raising 
• 
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the corisurription of good A' (assuming Epz < 0) to alleviate the tariff-
inflicted consumption distortion. A higher pollution tax provides not only a 
cleaner environment but also a larger tax revenue. Both of them are welfare 
improving. Also, we see that the cost of reducing the one pollution,Z, is 
greater than the benefit for producing one good, X , under the present of 
unemployment. Therefore a positive pollution tax is employed. 
Next we consider the optimal capital taxes: 
T。。= tRpK — t (dX/ds)E + Rx{dX/ds)E - Rx{dX/dT)G (27) 
wV-pvp R — {^kKIL-XlXlk)D _ ^ n p _ _ { X l X K K - X k X l k ) D _ < n 
W加le Ji — p2AXr^XLs{XLLXKK-Xl„) < U, r — p2AXlXiMXLLXkk:XIk�〈 U’ 
and G = -p{XksE + X^sF) < 0 
Turning to the sign of t。。，we expect that the unemployment effect of 
pollution taxes will again dominate that of capital taxes. As shown in the 
Appendix, the result is in alignment with our expectation. We can conclude 
that even we have capital subsidy, its employment effect only partially correct 
the unemployment ai.ised from the pollution tax. However, it is too early to 
determine the sign of r。。because it depends on the relative magnitudes 
‘ between the direct and indirect impacts of foreign capital on the output of 
good X. If the direct effect dominates, the capital inflow results in over-
辱 
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production of the import-competing sector, thereby causing a decrease in 
the volume of imports. Foreign investment will be taxed, since imports are 
already below the social optimal level with a tariff. But if the indirect effect 
dominates the direct effect, we will have a subsidy on foreign investment. We 
have, 
丁。。= tRpr< 一 t{dX/ds)E + 多 0 (28) 
AXl 
Pi.opostion 1: For a small open tariff-ridden economy with unemploy-
ment, the effect of the capital inflow on the level of pollution is dealt with 
the pollution tax (as show in the graph). Also, the optimal policy on for-
eign investment is a tax or subsidy, depending on whether foreign capital 
has an expansionary or a contractionary effect on the output of the import-
competing sector. 
Figure 1 illustrates the case of jointly optimal positive investment taxes 
and environmental taxes; Figure 2 describes the case of jointly optimal in-




decreased. Therefore, as the environment quality is on the mend, lower level 
of environmental taxes will be employed after tariff liberalization. 
Thus we are moving towards the first best optimum when the level of 





4 Trade and pollution Policies under Invest-
ment Tax Credits 
In this section, we conduct the analysis by assuming that tax credits are 
available. The current tax systems in the U.S. and in OECD countries are 
associated with the international tax credits - the tax liability in the source 
country can be deducted by the amount of taxes paid to the host country. 
This analysis differs from the previous section when the tax credits are not 
available. 
We follow Bond (1991) by incorporating the tax-credit system into the 
economy. For the foreign investors since the taxes paid to the host country 
can be deducted from the tax liablility in the source country, the effective tax 
rate applicable to foreign investment is max(r,r*) and the after-tax rate of 
return to foreign capital in the host country becomes R ^ — max(r, r*) which 
must be less than the case without tax credit in (15). We will expect more 
foreign capital will invest to the host countries. The equilibrium condition 
for the inflows of foreign capital in (15) is now modified as 
Rk{v^ 1, A, s, k) — max(r, = r* - r* (31) 
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We will analyze three possible cases of the inflows of capital, as follows: 
i) Cap i ta l subsidy in the host country In this case, we have r < 0. 
Equation (31) becomes 
RK〔P,H\S,K)—丁* -T 二 R本-T* ( 3 2 ) 
R k - r - r* (33) 
The tax credits become irrelevant as if the host country gives subsidies 
to foreign capital, all the subsidies would be captured by the source country. 
As a result, the capital market equilibrium condition is the same as the case 
without tax credit. •‘ 
ii) W i t h capital tax in the host country larger t han t ha t in the 
source country In this case, we have r > r*. 
Equation (31) becomes 
Rk-T = r*-T* (34) 




level of r, and hence the earlier results derived in the absence of tax credits 
hold qualitatively. 
iii) W i t h capital tax in the host country smaller t h a n tha t in 
the source country In this case, we have 0 < r < r* 
Equation (31) becomes 
Rk — 丁* = r* - 丁* (35) 
The rate of return on foreign capital in the host country depends on the 
tax rate, r\ in the source country. As we verify (31), the pre-tax Rk is fixed 
to the rate of r*, changes in home tax rates have no impact on the pre-tax 
rate of return on foreign capital once. This implies that the tax policy have 
no effects on foreign capital and the level of pollutants, i.e., dk/dr = 0, 
dZ/dr 二 0. Therefore, in the following section, we will concentrate on the 
study of the case that 0 < r < r*, as this differs from our previous analysis 
on the case when the rate of return on foreign capital in the host country 
depends on the host country's tax rate, r. 
* 
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4.1 Welfare Analysis on Capital Tax 
VVhen the tax-credit system is introduced in the source country, the cost of 
foreign capital in the host country instantly falls by the amount of credit 
granted if the domestic tax rate is lower than that of the source country. 
The marginal cost of "capital decreases from (r* + r) to r*. Clearly more 
foreign capital will enter the host country after the implementation of the 
tax credit. Although the capital tax in the host country has no allocative 
effect，there is an increase in capital tax revenue which is captured by the 
following equation, 
i ^u - tE.p.a){Aul A r) = •7(5A;/5t)t。 （36) 
After we consider the tax credit system, the capital tax in the host country 
becomes irrelevant, even if the host government does not change the tax rate. 
Since the tax rate become irrelevant when 0 < r < r*, the host gov-
ernrrierit can capture tax revenue from the source country by raising the 
domestic tax rate to match that of the foreign tax. The welfare effect of the 




totally differentiating (12) and (13) as 
— tEj^u)du = [s - [Ez - tEpuy^dz + (t _ tRpk)dk _ tRpsds (37) 
+Rx{dX/ds�ds + RxidX/dT)dT + Kdr 
Note that the last term in (34) shows the additional tax revenue brought 
by an increase in the home tax rate. 
Under 0 < r < r*, dZ/clr = dk/dr — 0, the secondary welfare effect of 
changes in the home tax rate is 
{Eu — tEp^){du/dT) = K + Rx{dX/dT) $ 0 (38) 
Although the higher tax rate will have more tax revenue from the source 
country, the higher capital tax will induce the welfare loss from unemploy-
ment, so we choose a level of capital tax which is less than the foreign capital 
tax in the source country, i.e. r** < r*, such that K — —Rx{dX/dT). See 
Chao and Yii (1998), which will choose the home tax rate equal to foreign 
capital tax, i.e. R = T*, when there is no unemployment. As a result, the 
‘ optimal capital tax should be set at a lower level in the case of unemploy-




bring more tax revenue but also induce urban unemployment. 
The optimal tax rate for the home country for 0 < r < r* under tax 
credits, the optimal tax schedule rotates to the horizontal line r*, and when 
r > T*, the optimal tax schedule follows through and coincides with the 
schedule r°. The result is shown in Figure 3. 
4.2 Welfare analysis on Capital Subsidy 
The introduction of the tax credit by the source country does not result in 
primary welfare changes, as can be seen from (3). The welfare effect of the 
J* 
tax credit depends only on whether or not the home country responds to the 
foreign use of tax credit. , 
i) the host country does not respond to the tax credit 
For 0 > r > it is clear that du/dr < 0，implying that the optimal 
policy must involve a capital subsidy. 
ii) the host country responds to the tax credit 
By switching from subsidizing foreign capital to imposing tax instead, we 
have in (15) 'du/dr > 0 for 0 < r < r* as discussed earlier. 
This suggest that the introduction of tax credits can generate a non-
corivexity in the optimal tax problem at r = 0 for the portion that T。< 0, as 
40 
illustrated by the opposite movements of vertical arrows in Figure 4. That is, 
the optimal tax/subsidy policy is not cut and tried; the reasoning is clear as 
a small increase in subsidy to capital will raise revenue from pollution taxes. 
While a small increase in the tax rate can capture some revenue from the 
som.ce country. Hence, both small increase in subsidy and tax can improve 
welfare. Hence, to choose the optimal policy, we need to compare the welfare 
level when 丁 = t* with the welfare level when the host country does not 
respond to the tax credit, i.e. r < 0. The government has to opt for raising 
revenue from pollution taxes by using capital-subsidy policy or capturing 
revenue from source country by using capital-tax policy. 
4.3 Policy in Simultaneous Change 
After we consider the capital tax/subsidy policy individually, now we turn to 
the case when both policy variables are amenable to simultaneous changes. 
4.3.1 Cap i t a l Tax 
When a positive capital tax is used at the outset, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
The jointly optimal policy depends on the relative magnitudes of r* and r。。. 




be T*. Therefore, if R* < r � � , the analysis resemble to the case without tax 
credit. The tax credit system is operational only in the case when T°° < R*. 
By capturing the primary and secondary tax revenue from the source country, 
the host country would be better off. Replacing r by 丁* in (21) , the 
corresponding optimal pollution tax becomes 
= {t{dx/ds) - Rx{dX/ds) - {t* - tRpk){dk/ds) (39) 
HE, - tEp,){dZ/ds)}/{dZ/ds) 
By comparing (^9) with (24), If r* > T。。，we have s。* < s。。 
广 — = -[{dk/ds)/{dz/ds)]{r* - r°。） (40) 
Recalling that dk/ds < 0 and dz/ds < 0, we have s°* < s。。when T* > T°°. 
This implies that when the home tax rate is smaller than the foreign rate, the 
introduction of a tax-credit system by the source country can make the host 
country better off at the expense of the source country. The host country 
captures the tax revenue from the source country. Consequently, the host 
‘ country can afford to be lax on its pollution policy directed toward foreign 
investment. We have the following proposition. 
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Proposition 4: when a tax on foreign capital in the host country is higher 
than the tax in the source country, the use of the tax credits in the source 
country will lead to increase the investment tax rate but decrease the pollu-
tion tax rate. 
Changes in the level of Foreign Cap i t a l and Po l l u t i on Emiss ions 
When T* > , a foreign invest tax-credit system will induce the host coun-
try to raise its optimal investment tax from r°° to r* and lower its optimal 
pollution tax from s°�to Although the capital tax itself has no alloca-
tive effect(see 4)revious analysis), the level of foreign captial and pollution 
emission do change due to the primary effect of inflow of foreign capital (as 
the marginal cost of capital decrease due to the tax credit system) and the 
secondary effect arising from the response to the tax credit. 
A/c/ A r = Ak/ A r +{dk/ds){As/ A r ) > 0 (41) 
AZ/ AT = {dZ/dk){Ak/ A r ) +{dZ/ds){As/ A r ) > 0 (42) 
A A / A r 二 AA /AT|T=T。 °+ (5A / a s ) (As /A r ) <0 (43) 
‘ where dk/ds < 0, dz/ds < 0 and dX/ds > 0. Note that As = s。* - < 0 
and AT = T* — T。。> 0. After the introduction of the tax credit system 
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in the source country, the marginal cost of capital decreases, causing an 
increase in foreign capital inflows and consequently a rise in the level of 
pollution. Furthermore, the tax credit will lead to a reduction in the optimal 
pollution tax, and hence a further deterioration in the environment quality 
on the host nation. Although the unemployment will not change as the 
host country capital tax after the use of tax credit in the source country, 
the imemploynient rate do decrease as the optimal pollution tax is less than 
before. 
The tax credit introduced in the source country will affect the welfare of 
the host country. Such a welfare effect can be obtained by substituting s°* 
in (39) to (37)，and then combining the result with (36) to obtain 
AT) = -(dk/dr)r°° + K + {dz/ds){s°° - s°*)(As/ A r) 
+Rx{dX/ds){As/ AT) (44) 
where s。。is the pollution tax before the introduction of tax credits by the 
source country. 
The welfare effect can be deduced from (44) with the aid of Figure 3. 
Before the introduction of tax credit system in the source country, the equi-
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libriiim of the Jointly optimal policies that characteristizes the second-best 
rmx of investment and pollution taxes, T。。and s。。，respectively is depicted 
by point N. Besides the primary effect in the first term of (44), the use of tax 
credit leads to the increase of capital tax to r*, to point T, thereby improving 
welfare through a secondary effect, as expressed by the second term of (44). 
Furthermore, the higher investment-tax rate causes the pollution tax, s, to 
fall from s � � t o 广 at point C. The fall in the pollution tax also improve 
welfare, as capture by the third term of (44). Finally, the fall in pollution 
tax reduce the unemployment, and hence, welfare- improving, as capture by 
the last term o广(44). 
The follow proposition is immediate. 
Proposition 5: when the investment tax rate in the host country is less 
than that in the source coutnry, the introduction of tax credit in the source 
country improve the host country's welfare, but deteriorate the host country's 
environmental quality. 
4.3.2 Cap i ta l subsidy 
For each policy in isolation, the optimal tax rate for the portion that r° < 0 
is indeterminate, when a subsidy on foreign capital is used initially, T。。< 
0. Multiple equilibria may exist for jointly optimal tax and pollution tax 
暑 
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policies. Figure 4 shows the existence of two equilibria as indicated by point 
N and point C. Point N is the equilibrium that the most country does not 
response to tax credits and point C is the equilibrium that the host country 
responses to tax credits. To response to the tax credits, from point N to point 
T, i.e., T = 0, the welfare is actually getting worse. From point T to T’，as 
the capital tax attain the level of t* , the welfare is improving. After the 
adjustment of capital tax, the pollution tax decreases which is indicated by 
the movement to point C. These welfare effects can be shown by using (44), 
except 丁。。< 0. The first term on the right-hand side of (44) now represent 
a welfare-worsening effect from responding to the tax credit by eliminating 
capital subsidy (the movement from point N to T). If the gains of increases 
in tax revenue (signified by the movements from point T to C) outweighed 
the loss, a combination of pollution tax and capital tax is the jointly optimal 
policy; otherwise, capital subsidy remains the optimal policy. The following 
prposition is immediate. 
Proposition 5: When a subsidy to foreign capital in host country is used 
initially, the original adopted subsidy policy may switch to a tax policy after 
• the introdcution of the tax credit in the source country. Such move will also 
trigger the host country to lower the polluti(in tax. 
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Although there may be the reduction pollution tax, the switch may still 
improve the environment. The reason is that a lower level of foreign capital 
caused by the removal of capital subsidy dominates the rise in the level of 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
This paper has analysed the second best policies for an economy with a 
pre-existing tariff and unemployment. Based on a small, capital-importing 
general-equilibrium model, we have examined the individual and the joint 
effects on pollution and capital tax policies when tax credits are absent or 
present in the source country. In the absence of tax credits, the joint optimal 
policy is a pollution tax along with a foreign-investment tax or subsidy. 
However, when the investment tax credits are allowed in the source coun-
tiy and the foreign tax rate exceeds that of the host country, the tax-credit .一 
system will result in a higher investment tax rate but a lower pollution tax. 
The welfare of the host country increases by capturing some capital-tax rev-
enue from the source country while environmental quality deteriorates in 
the host country. Moreover, the source-country's tax credits can induce the 
host country to switch its initial policy from capital subsidy to capital tax. 
Although this policy switch induces a lower pollution tax, the environment 
may still be improved if capital taxes can lead to a significant contraction 
in the polluting industry. We know that environmental protection may not 
- b e the first target of many developing countries. Such environmental poli-
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6.1 Resource allocation 
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dLx — p'^A{Xi^sX,a<-XKsXu<) ^ n 
- — D < U 
抓/ — v^MXKsXLt-Xi^sXu<) z n 




幽=p2v^(\+\){XksXLK-XL^XKK) \ n 
ds D 〉U 
巡 - ( 1 +X)''YLLiXtsXKK-XKsXr.K) \ n 
ds 一 — ~o > U 
Eu = dE/du > 0, Epu 二 dDx/du > 0, Epp = dDx/dp < 0 
Eu — tEpu > 0，linear homogeneity of Eu in all price 
is the direct impact of the pollution tax on tariff distortion. 
竺 = d X dLx dX dKx 
— dLx ds ^ dKx ds 
二 - + XIXXlsXKK - X^sX^^)] 
" D <0 
些 = a 坠 dZ dX dKx 
— dX dLx ds + dX dKx ds 
二 - XlsXLK) + X,{XISXKK — X^sX^j,)] 
— ‘ D ‘ < 0 
dr dLx dr dKx dr D < ° 
• 
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£Z _ dZ dX dLx dZ dX dKx — pA{XlXlk — XkXll) ^ • 
= dXdLx dr + dX dKx dr — D 
6.2 Unemployment effect 
Evaluation of the two employment effects under the scheme of optimal pol-
lution taxes 
- U f B + t o 
(1+入I (XLSXK K-XKSXlk) pXjj, 
二 --tla 
- I D{XKSXLL-XLSXLK) 
_ ^ PAXLXLS(XLLXKK-XIj^) _ 
—一几入[ AXLXLS(XILXkk-XIJ^) 
Evaluation of the two employment effects under the scheme of optimal 
capital taxes 
N 
p'^jl+XfYLLiXLsXKK-^KsXtK) D{X K^H-X LX LK) 
— I D p''AXLXLs[XLLXKK-Xlt^) I 
-XIk) J 




6.3 Cost a nd benef i t of p roduc t i on of good X 
^z —九入 AX乙 
n. TT/ r (l+^fYLL 
二 么2 - p L X i y 广 入 ) 1 
一 P ^ LX(1+A)Vll 
Smce < 1, we have ^ . - p ^ f S f e > • 
6.4 T h e 丁。and s�schedules 
From (18), the T。curve in the (s’r) space is 
r。== {[tRpK {dk/dr) + {Ez - tEpz) dZ/dr] - Rx {dX/dr) — s(dZ/dT)} / {dk/dr) 
and from (20) the s° can be expressed as 
F \ 
t [dX/ds + RpKidk/ds)] + {Ez - tEpz) dZ/ds 
r = } I /{dk/ds)-s° {dz/ds) {ds/dk) 
-Rx {dX/ds) 
\ 乂 
Then, we cannot summarize that whicl^ intercept is large 
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» • 
{t [dX/ds + RpK{dk/ds)] + (Ez - tEpz) dZ/ds - R,, {dX/ds)} /{dk/ds) 
-{[tRpK {dk/dr) + {Ez - tEpz) dZ/dr] — R^ {dX/dr)} / [dk/dr) 
— t{dX/ds)D ( p _ 、XlXls(XllXkk-XIJ^) 
—P'A{XKsX,,-XtsXLK)十、必2 — T � Z ) X,L(XksXLL-X:^SXU<) 
—X AXLL{XksXLL-XLSXLK) > 
Analogously, we can compare the slopes of the two curves and show 
that the s° curve is stepper than the T° curve 
-{clZ/dr) / {dk/dr) + {dZ/ds) / {ds/dk) 
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Figure 1 Optimal investment tax and pollution tax 
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